The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Catholic Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2018

“Dignity in Living and in Dying”: The Henry H. H. Remak Memorial
Lecture
George P. Smith II

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George P. Smith II, “Dignity in Living and in Dying”: The Henry H. H. Remak Memorial Lecture, 25 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413 (2018).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Catholic Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Catholic Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

“DIGNITY IN LIVING AND IN DYING”: THE HENRY H. H...., 25 Ind. J. Global...

25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 413
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
Spring, 2018
Lecture

George P. Smith, II aa1
Professor Emeritus
Copyright © 2018 by Indiana University Maurer School of Law; George P. Smith, II

“DIGNITY IN LIVING AND IN DYING”: THE HENRY H. H. REMAK
MEMORIAL LECTURE a1
INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 2016, Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, was streamed from New
York University to Indiana University and delivered thoughtful and perceptive comments on the topic of this seminar.
Professor Barak's book, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right is an important voice in
the international dialogue on Human Dignity.
Justice Barak's comments of November 3rd provide a rich background for today's lecture. The lack of a universal
or constitutional value of Human Dignity has not prevented thirty-two of some forty-five European countries from
recognizing it in some form or other. 1 In Germany, for example, although Human Dignity is recognized in the
Constitution as “inviolable,” ongoing debate centers on whether Human Dignity is a constitutional value or should be
regarded as a *414 constitutional right or seen as an absolute right together with the extent to which safeguards against
humiliation should be provided. 2
Justice Barak sees Human Dignity as an absolute right. 3 Indeed, for the Justice, Human Dignity is a framework, core,
or “mother right” in that it unites all values underlying express and implicit constitutional rights and guarantees. 4 The
right to liberty in the U.S. Constitution is an example of a framework right. 5
The extent of this international debate over the significance and the “utility” of Human Dignity as a normative value or
as an absolute right guaranteed constitutionally sets the theme of this lecture today.
Interestingly, as illustrated in American case law, since World War II, Human Dignity has been embraced as a
constitutional value and has played an important role in the interpretation of a number of rights set forth in our own
Bill of Rights. 6
Dignity is seen commonly as an ethical obligation owed to human persons. The dimensions of this obligation in today's
post secular society are, however, subject to wide discussion and debate; for the term, human dignity, and its preservation,
defies universal agreement. Yet, its preservation, together with the prevention of indignity, is a guiding principle or at
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least a vector of force in a wide range of issues ranging from recognizing and protecting the civil rights of the citizen
members of the LGBTQ community throughout the nation to the care of the disabled and to the dying.
In clinical medicine, safeguarding the dignity of the patient is a core responsibility of all physicians to respect patient
autonomy and to act with beneficence in health care decisions. Similarly, in protecting the civil rights of free association
for all Americans--without reference to gender or sexual lifestyle preferences--contemporary society must accord nonjudgmental respect for the actions of its members so long as that conduct is neither harmful nor illegal. 7
Foundational instruments such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights all codify a mandate to
ensure human dignity within various contexts of *415 international conduct. 8 The notion itself is stated normally in
grandiloquent terminology without more, and always subject to progressive realization rather than absolute recognition.
Ongoing international efforts must continue to be taken to guide the actions of states in seeking to set and to maintain
levels of cultural and social conduct, which serve to safeguard human dignity throughout life and especially at its endstage.
Within the United States, five states and the District of Columbia legislatively, and one, judicially, moved toward
recognition of a right to die with dignity (when confronted with a diagnosis and a prognosis of medical futility is
commendable); 9 for, such actions validate the very essence of autonomy and self-determination, which are correctly
viewed as the bulwark of the social order of American society.
I. HUMAN DIGNITY: DEFINITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES
Acknowledged as a notion that neither exists in today's society nor is a proper description of the world, human dignity is
nonetheless accepted as possibly “the premier value underlying the last two centuries of moral and political thought.” 10
The degree to which law accommodates dignity is evolving, 11 as the precise meaning of human *416 dignity can only
be tested within the context of specific factual (e.g., situational) settings. 12
As a moral term, dignity suggests how individuals should or should not be treated individually or as a group within
a given social and cultural context. 13 Accordingly, no acceptable standard working definition of dignity is uniformly
applicable. 14 At a minimum, dignity means “respect for the intrinsic worth of every person.” 15
Grounded in the concept of autonomy by Kant, who is acknowledged as the father of the concept itself, dignity was cast
as a normative legal ideal. 16 Nations have either chosen to relate human dignity to the status of a foundational right
supporting all other rights or, alternatively, have paired it with rights to equality and of liberty. 17 Within the second
paragraph of the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, human dignity appears as an ideal that “the peoples
of the United Nations” are “determined” to achieve--this, by reaffirmation of their “faith in *417 fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small.” 18
The noble and lofty ideal of dignity allows easy acceptance and affirmation, though it is nearly devoid of a substantive
context. The application of dignity as a normative standard is much akin to the test Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
set in 1964 for determining when something is obscene. Using a common sense subjective standard, Justice Stewart said,
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famously, that he knew obscenity when he saw it. 19 Indeed, Oscar Schacter opined that while violations of human
dignity were difficult to determine, they could nonetheless be assessed by using the epistemology of “I know it when I
see it even if I cannot tell you what it is.” 20 Perhaps a similar common sense, intuitive approach or even a consensus
morality 21 to assessing dignity--and practices of indignity--could be used, for example, in evaluating cases of misconduct
in managing end-of-life care.
In an effort to quantify conduct that degrades human dignity, various lists have been compiled of conduct and ideas
that are “implicitly incompatible with the basic ideas of the inherent dignity and worth of human persons.” 22 Among
some twelve levels of conduct which challenge the notion of dignity are “degrading living conditions and deprivation
of basic needs”; “statements that demean and humiliate individuals or groups because of their origins, status or belief”;
and “medical treatment or hospital care insensitive to individual choice or the requirements of human personality.” 23
Central to the very ideal of human dignity, then, are modes of conduct and ideas antithetical or incompatible with respect
for basic or inherent dignity. 24
In Emily Smith's new book, The Power of Meaning: Crafting a Life that Matters, she comments on the extent to which
elder abuse and neglect raise serious challenges to the whole notion of personal dignity. *418 In one study of longterm care for the elderly, forty percent of nursing home staff members admitted to committing psychological abuse, such
as swearing and yelling at residents; depriving them of food; or subjecting them to inappropriate isolation. In another
study, four in ten nursing home residents reported that they had been abused or observed abuse. 25
It is within the very issue of death management, however, that human dignity is tested rigorously, both as to parameters
of personal dignity and to basic dignity. 26 Indeed, within end-of-life care, dignity can be characterized as a human rights
issue. 27 In everyday conversation, dignity at death means the avoidance of “being helpless, incontinent, incoherent,
dependent, drooling, a burden to others and of poor general deportment. 28
A powerful interface exists between the right to human dignity and the right to life; for, “many of the claims to a right
to die with dignity actually reaffirm a more general commitment to life (including life shared, love, and humanity) and
to the ending of one's life in dignity.” 29 In this sense, “an affirmation of human dignity, its strength and grandeurs,
is an affirmation of the eternity of life.” 30 These fundamental human rights reflect, plainly, the interrelated right to a
basic quality of life and, additionally, “in the rights to adequate food, health care, and shelter recognized in Article 25
of the Universal Declaration [on Human Rights].” 31 Inasmuch as death is a part of life, “choice concerning life must
necessarily include those concerning the end and ending of life.” 32
*419 Included within the right to human dignity must be “a right to live with dignity, and thus a right to end one's life
without indignity-- indeed, a right not to be compelled to live the remainder of life in indignity.” 33 When remaining
life has little quality and yields indignity, it is both humane and efficacious to respect “the dignity of personal choice”
made to conclude it. 34
While no express right to die with dignity is found in definitive instruments on human rights, 35 the very Charter of the
United Nations addresses the need to protect and safeguard the essential “dignity and worth of the human person.” 36
“The inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family” is recognized in the preamble of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. 37 The Declaration states further that not only are “[a]ll human beings ... born free and equal in
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dignity and rights” but each is entitled to have both respect and value, and to a right to dignity. 38 An interrelated right
of privacy is, furthermore, recognized in Article 12 of the Declaration. 39 Even though phrased as a qualified right, it is
nonetheless viewed correctly as extending in scope to include all personal associational choices as well as those regarding
death and dying. 40
II. HUMAN DIGNITY: ITS RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL PROVENANCE
Although the classical world does not regard dignity as inherent to all individuals, the notion of dignity or human worth
was recognized in early history--but only for virtuous persons. 41 Consequently, orphans, slaves, and those with physical
defects were excluded altogether from qualifying for an ascription to dignity. 42
The early views of the Jewish and the Christian faiths ascribed to the idea that all human beings were made in the image
and likeness of *420 God. 43 This concept subsequently grew into acceptance of the premise that the body and the
soul were integrated. 44 This understanding of Imago Dei, or the image of God, in all of God's creations, provided the
foundation for the belief that there was an intrinsic value in each of those who bore his image. 45
Interestingly, the word, “dignity,” derives from the Latin dignitas, (i.e., worth) and digness (worthy). When applied to
homo sapiens, this etymology implies that every individual must be acknowledged as imbued with an inherent value and,
accordingly, be treated with proper respect. 46
Much of the contemporary understanding of human dignity can be attributed to religion and to ancient civilizations. 47
Indeed, human rights, like those enumerated in modern international instruments, also have a clear provenance in history
and biblical faith; for, within equality, concern for the poor and social justice are to be found the very seeds of human
rights and the dignity of man. 48
Within the community of world religions, a consistently strong leadership role in securing the dignity of personhood can
be claimed properly by the Roman Catholic faith. 49 His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, in remarks made on March 30,
2006, observed that today--as in the past--the principle focus of interventions by the Catholic Church has been to protect
and to promote the dignity of the person, both from the “moment of conception until natural death.” 50
Pope (now Saint) John Paul II, in his Apostolic Letter Salvifica Doloris, issued February 11, 1984, spoke eloquently
of the essentiality of “every individual to ‘stop,’ as the Good Samaritan did, at the suffering of *421 one's neighbor,
to have ‘compassion’ for that suffering and to give some help.” 51 The Pope urged the cultivation of a “sensitivity of
heart” which--in turn--“bears witness to compassion toward a suffering person,” 52 and to an understanding that humans
should be treated “as a psychological and physical whole.” 53
Previously in his encyclical, Pacem in Terris, issued in 1963, Pope John Paul XXIII declared: “Man has the right to life.
He has the right to bodily integrity, and to the means necessary for the proper development of life ... he has the right
to be looked after in the event of ill-health.” 54
III. CONTEMPORARY IMPRECISIONS AND PENUMBRIC HAZE
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For some, the rise of human dignity as a normative value is seen as “awkward, clumsy, sloppy, instrumental, inflationary
and open to judicial vagary,” 55 as well as “ad hoc, erratic, ‘muddled and inconsistent.”’ 56 Since dignity is incapable
of being “operationalized,” 57 it is argued that it cannot be recognized as a policy standard. 58 Indeed, in the United
States, there has simply been “no coalescence ... around the rational possibilities that exist for a legal theory of human
dignity.” 59 Thus, the legal ontology of dignity lies in obfuscation. 60
Yet, even with these negative arguments against the recognition and the application of dignity as a normative value,
America, contrary to some European countries, has nonetheless chosen to base its socio-legal and ethical understanding
of dignity on the libertarian tradition of *422 anchoring dignity to notions of paternalism or communitarism. 61
Dignity is acknowledged as the United States Constitution's fundamental value and the “cardinal principle for which
the Constitution stands.” 62
Further, it has been asserted that dignity can neither “be demanded or claimed” nor provided or owed. 63 Rather, it is
either expected or found “in every living being,” for “in principle, it is autocratic.” 64 Others have opined that dignity
“is a mindset formed by others who observed our courage, honesty, and perseverance in the face of dignity.” 65 The
notion of a “right” to dignity for those holding this opinion is that there can be no right to dignity. 66 It remains an open
question whether dignity is properly considered as an integral component of the very concept of personhood derived
from autonomy, equality, or liberty or, whether it is an independent attribute of personhood. 67
It was announced this past February, 2017, that former Vice President Joe Biden and his wife, Jill, have established the
Biden Foundation whose purpose, as an educational foundation, is to explore “the ways that everyone--no matter their
income level, race, gender, age, or sexuality--can expect to be treated with dignity and to receive a fair shot at achieving
the American Dream.” 68 Commendable though this effort is, the task undertaken by the Foundation of securing “the
American Dream” for everyone is truly formidable.
In addition to the Biden Foundation, two independent organizations have, for quite some time, been making slow, but
positive, progress in working toward advancing and protecting human dignity.
Dignity and Respect, Inc., is a collaborative initiative inspiring people throughout the world to treat everyone with
dignity and respect. Community organizations, youth programs, and schools are used as fora for educating and
propagating the values of diversity and inclusion for this contemporary society. 69
*423 Freedom House, headquartered in Washington, D.C., leads the Dignity for All consortium of eight prominent
human rights and LGBTQ organizations, which support the proposition of securing dignity for all. In particular,
Freedom House supports legal assistance, funds medical expenses, supports dependents, and covers relocation costs
when LGBTQ activists come under threats or attacks. LGBTQ persons face discrimination, persecution, and egregious
human rights violations simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Interestingly, and sadly, consensual
same-sex conduct is still criminalized in seventy-six countries; and in five countries, this conduct is subject to the death
penalty. 70
These last two organizations have an important role to play in addressing the serious issues of teenage suicide. In a recent
study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, suicide was the second most common cause of death
among adolescents age fifteen to twenty-four. Sexual minorities were found to be at increased risk for suicide. More
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than 29% of gay, lesbian, and bisexual high school students reported attempting suicide within the past twelve months-relative to 6% for heterosexual students. After same-sex marriages became legal in the United States and some states
recognized same-sex association, the percentage of gay, lesbian and bisexual teens attempting suicide dropped 14%. 71
Reshaping moral and social perspectives and cultural stereotypes, which have all too often been encoded into the fabric
of daily living over the years, is daunting. LGBTQ “rights” are still, for the most part, embryonic. The Civil Rights
Commission, established in 1957 by Congress as a component of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, has been a watchdog
(often toothless and slumbering) in investigating reporting of civil rights violations. 72
Yet, the Commission was, to one degree or other, helpful in the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964, the
Voting Rights Act *424 of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 73
Today, the Commission might well use its 1977 report on Sex Bias in the U.S. Code 74 as a starting point to undertake
a serious assessment of today's discrimination of members of the LGBTQ community. Although lacking in a sustained
level of power, the Commission still has a level of visibility. And visibility is central to messaging.
One of the most contentious medical, socio-legal issues of the day will soon be presented to the U.S. Supreme Court
for resolution. That issue is whether transgender students may have access to school restrooms consistent with their
personal gender views and preferences rather than being held to birth certificate biological identification for purposes
of restroom use. 75
It would be speculative to surmise what position the Court will take here as well as other transgender concerns regarding
the scope of their “rights” as prison inmates to receive hormone therapy 76 and sexual reassignment surgery. 77
Whatever decision the Court reaches on these issues will significantly impact the way in which society, as a whole, views
and acts on the requisite values of liberty, the normative standards or values of dignity, and the consequences of indignity.
IV. DIGNITY INTERESTS AND THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court has largely acknowledged the concept of dignity interests as a background norm-yet accepts it, in Eighth Amendment inquiries, as a primary force. 78 In fact, when interpreting the 8th Amendment's
imposition of affirmative obligations *425 on the states, the Court often links liberty and dignity and thereby implies--if
not states specifically--that from recognizing human dignity comes the imposition of a state duty to care for its citizens. 79
Domestically, the phrase, “human dignity,” was first used in the United States Supreme Court by Justice Frank W.
Murphy in a dissenting opinion in the case of In re Yamashita in 1946. 80 Subsequently, the Court has employed this
term or referenced the “dignity of man” 81 in a considerable number of cases. 82
More recently, on June 28, 2015, writing for the majority in Obergefell v. Hodges et al. 83 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
articulated--repeatedly--the need to acknowledge and to embrace the realization that “certain personal choices [are]
central to individual dignity and autonomy” and are inherent liberties protected by Due Process guarantees of the 14th
Amendment. 84 These expanded liberties are, as such, not enumerated within the Bill of Rights but must be accepted as
within the scope of individual autonomy. 85 When “a claim of dignity” conflicts “with both law and wide spread social
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conventions,” 86 as well as “substantial cultural and political developments,” the conflicts must be resolved in favor of
safeguarding the dignity of personhood. 87
In the landmark 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 which legitimized consensual same-sex relations between adults,
Justice Kennedy's powerful and eloquent reasoning was dominant in the majority opinion that he wrote for the Court.
Stating that the right to personal liberty under the Due Process Clauses confers a full right to engage in personal
consensual conduct, Kennedy drew upon shared values of a wider civilization and, specifically, the European Court
of Human Rights, where intimate (consensual) conduct has been affirmed as a protected right. 89 For Kennedy, the
“components of liberty in its manifold possibilities,” 90 were not set out or anticipated when the Due Process Clauses of
the 5th Amendment or the 14th Amendment were drawn and ratified. 91 Consequently, “as the Constitution endures,
persons in every *426 generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.” 92
In an equally eloquent concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed that “moral disapproval is not a
legitimate state interest to justify state regulation.” 93
The positions taken by Justice Kennedy in Obergefell 94 and Lawrence 95 illustrate clearly, by analogy, that the dignity
of personhood is as important in its associational freedoms as it is in health care decision-making at the end-stage of
life where personal autonomy, liberty, and well-being, humanness, and compassion are vital components to assure a
dignified death.
V. DOMESTIC OR NATIONAL PRECEDENTS
The concurrence of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the 1989 case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, is
pertinent 96 to issues of end-of-life care.
Holding that the refusal of food and water delivered artificially is an act within a protected liberty interest as unwanted
medical treatment, Justice O'Connor observed that “[O]ur notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with an idea
of physical freedom and self-determination,” and, furthermore, a state that forces “a competent adult to endure such
procedures against her will burdens the patients liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own
treatment.” 97 Stressing the compromise of the “integrity of personhood” by forcible intrusions of this nature, the Justice
asserted, “[t]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply
personal decision to reject medical treatment including the *427 artificial delivery of good and water.” 98 The very
same “minimal conditions necessary for a life in dignity,” 99 (e.g., autonomy, respect, self-determination, compassion,
humaneness, and decency) then are the very same conditions and values that should prevail in the management of the
end-stage of life.
The Cruzan case was pivotal in developing a constitutional jurisprudence for end-of-life management. The notion of a
recognized liberty interest in dying without refractory pain and suffering--both for competent and, arguably, incompetent
patients 100 --was validated by the Cruzan holding. 101 As a consequence of this liberty interest in dying without pain,
with as much dignity as possible, when challenges to its exercise are raised, courts should proceed to balance this liberty
against competing state interests to protect vulnerables (e.g., the aged and infirm and the unhealthy). 102 State interest in
preserving a terminally ill person's life would obviously be weaker than preserving life that is not in its terminal phase. 103
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The Cruzan construct for decision-making--anchored, as such, in the common law right to refuse treatment--is a more
reasonable approach to analysis than validating a fundamental right to die with dignity. 104
Were a right to death to be recognized as a fundamental right, a vexatious dilemma would follow: namely, should
the state be charged, correspondingly, with an equal obligation to both bestow, as well as guarantee, a life with
dignity? 105 “If ensuring dignity at death is the government's responsibility, dignity during life is an equal, if not greater,
responsibility.” 106
Under circumstances of this nature, it would follow that dignity would be denominated an entitlement. 107 Although
set as a responsibility within modern state institutions, 108 dignity in life is not a precise and integral value in the U.S.
Constitution. 109 It is better to view the Constitution as providing negative rights rather than affirmative *428 ones. 110
Consequently, citizens are granted liberty to access-- without government power--their individual consciences and the
visions for attaining happiness. 111
The relationship between the U.S. Constitution and death is difficult for courts to determine. 112 The legislatures are
far better equipped to enact statutes which draw lines of distinction--for example, between physician-assisted suicide
and euthanasia. 113
When presented with issues of physician-assisted suicide and the states' right to prohibit it, the Supreme Court has held in
two pathbreaking cases, Vaco v. Quill 114 and Washington v. Glucksberg, 115 that it was valid, constitutionally, to prohibit
suicide in part because the idea of physician-assisted suicide was not part of the Nation's history or its traditions 116 and
laws prohibiting such conduct were not in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 117
In the concurring opinions in both Quill and Glucksberg, Justice O'Connor implies that a constitutional liberty exists,
when a terminal or futile medical condition is diagnosed for one, to be free from the refractory pain experienced from
such a condition. 118 But, without “great suffering,” there can be no constitutional claim. 119 In these two cases, there
was adequate pain relief legally available to the moving parties. 120 Accordingly, the “liberty” found in the Due Process
Clause, which could arguably embrace a coordinate liberty to use assistance in and out of suicide, motivated solely to
avoid a painful and undignified death, was not an “operable” fact in these cases. 121 There was a direct implication,
however, in Justice O'Connor's concurrence that in situations where no intractable pain was present and no state
legislation was in play, a different judicial result might occur. 122
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his concurrence in Glucksberg, recognizes Justice O'Connor's notion of a liberty interest as
central to *429 any action to avoid intolerable pain “and the indignity of living one's final days incapacitated and in
agony.” 123 When statutory mandates are either vague and indeterminate or lacking altogether, this formulation should
be seen as more judicially palpable than seeking precise limits to a “right” to die with dignity. 124
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
As observed, five states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that allow those with a terminal medical condition
to seek pharmacologic assistance from a physician to end their own lives. 125 One state supreme court, Montana,
concluded that while there was no constitutional right to die with dignity in the state, physician assistance for those in
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the end-stage of life did not violate state legislation designed to protect the terminally ill, nor was such assistance against
state public policy to protect vulnerable individuals. 126
Similarly, in parts of Europe--notably, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland--a legislative right of the terminally
ill to have assistance in ending their lives has been recognized. 127
VII. FUNDAMENTAL OR COMPETING HUMAN RIGHTS?
The modern genesis of human rights is to be found in the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 128 together with the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 129 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 130
*430 By their very nature, human rights are inherent to all individuals and not dependent upon the state for either
their existence or their enjoyment. 131 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims this basic principle when
it acknowledges, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 132 The function of human rights is
to create state obligations, not to create general ethics. 133 Human rights are seen properly as setting not only minimum
standards for governance but as a means for safeguarding against state oppression. 134 Indeed, these rights “are at the
heart of a free and democratic society.” 135
While the Universal Declaration is non-binding, significant parts have attained the status of binding--by rules of
customary international law or, alternatively, are acknowledged as part of those general principles of law subscribed to
by civilized nations. 136 It has been said, in fact, that the enumerated rights set forth within the Declaration are “made
whole by dignity.” 137 In and of themselves, the principles enumerated within the Declaration are not human rights.
Respect for human dignity is the catalyst for a human rights policy whenever freedom and equality are jeopardized. 138
VIII. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN
The provenance of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to be found within the ideas and philosophies of the
eighteenth century *431 Enlightenment, the American and French revolutions, and the movement toward democracy
and of liberalism. 139 “On the surface, they reflect the democratization and universalization of values and norms which
have always been held as a supreme, existential importance by men, tribes, nations, the world over and by the ruling
classes at least in the West.” 140 Central to the notion of citizenship, for the Greeks through the ideal of the Politea and
for the Romans in the civis romanus, were the core values of liberty, dignity, and self-determination; 141 just as in the
same fashion that it was asserted by European societies, and the nobility. 142
The theory of the “Rights of Man” was drawn from past beliefs, as well as traditions and experiences by the intellectual
leaders of the West. 143 In fact, this bold contention was the basis for proclaiming the inalienable rights of citizens in the
U.S. Declaration of Independence 144 and, to a degree, the substance of the American national identity 145 and value
system. 146
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Recognized since the end of World War II as not only legal norms but also as legitimate criteria for asserting, establishing,
and maintaining political legitimacy, 147 human rights have now achieved such a universal pre-eminence that a modern
state is seen as neither legitimate nor complete without an accounting of a human rights record. 148
Human dignity, quite simply goes to the very heart of what being a person embraces in a value system. Yet, as a theorized
concept, dignity has often been seen as “incomplete” because, to be an adequate normative account, it lacks a “wellspecified counterpart obligation.” 149 Even with a “charge” of incompleteness, a fundamental assertion may be made:
namely, that there is an overlapping consensus, which exists *432 regarding the values that underlie the acceptance of
dignity as a human right where worth must be secured and protected by the states. 150
Over succeeding years, as in the past, the focus of the “human rights debate” will be the extent to which economic, social,
and cultural rights are as cognizable and equal as civil and political rights. 151 Arguments will seek to either prioritize
rights--placing differing moral rights on them-- or, alternatively, asserting that fundamental rights cannot be ranked,
but must be equally honored. 152 The perception of the inferiority of economic, social, and cultural rights to civil and
political rights raises a serious concern that endowing such rights with “human rights status” would have the end result
of “weakening traditional human rights” and thus playing havoc with the notion of allowing violations of economic,
social, and cultural rights to be justifiable. 153
“A common ground of moral understanding” must be reached before minimum standards of behavior can be negotiated
and, ideally, morphed by all states into a standard of universality for the uniform application of human rights. 154
Once a basic acceptance of “performance” standards is attained, adjustments can be allowed--tied as such to differing
legal, moral and cultural value systems within each state. 155 Yet, even with the attainment of this ideal model scenario,
where by treaty, acquiesce, or custom states rise to a “universal” acceptance and enforcement of human rights, one
overpowering geopolitical policy consideration must be understood: the core determinants of the level of respect,
protection, and enforcement of those rights is tied, unalterably, to the level of economic development and self-sufficiency
of each state. 156
IX. ADVANCING A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Pivotal to a global initiative to structure a framework in order to advance a new human rights constitutionalism 157
are three instruments: *433 The Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights 158 of 1998, the 2003
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 159 and the Universal Bioethics Declaration of 2005. 160 In addition
to these Declarations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 161 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 162 and the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights 163 set forth working principles
and imposed obligations which bear a direct, rather than a tangential, relationship to normative medical ethics. 164
Human rights, bioethics, and medical ethics are linked together, inextricably, by provisions in these United Nations
Declarations, which require respect for human dignity and equality, the right to life, and the realization of a standard of
living, which promotes health and assures medical care together with the right to be free from inhumane and degrading
treatment. 165
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The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights was adopted, on October 19, 2005, by the member states
of UNESCO. 166 The Declaration in Article 1 enunciates a Principle of Social Responsibility, which directs decisions
and practices in science and technology to promote “the common good” by providing “access to adequate nutrition and
water,” eliminating the marginalization of persons, and reducing poverty and illiteracy. 167 Article 15 strengthens the
very notion of social responsibility by directing the benefits of scientific research to advance “access to quality health
care” and “support for health services.” 168
*434 Articles 21 through 24 of the Bioethics and Human Rights Declaration deal with transnational practices, 169 the
role of states, 170 in bioethics education, 171 together with standards of international cooperation needed to promote not
only the advancement of life sciences and technologies while, at the same time, respecting and promoting human dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 172 The Declaration can be properly seen as a creative effort to recognize, and
thus validate, an inextricable symbiotic relationship between human dignity and human rights with “access” to health
care. Indeed, in this regard, if not accepted as an independent human right, dignity must be accepted as, at a minimum,
an integral part of the human right to health care.
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, although of marginal impact because of its limited
ratification, should nonetheless be recognized as a creative illustration of linkage with bioethics, medical ethics, and the
norms of international human rights. 173 This linkage is found through policies regulating equitable access to healthcare
and informed consent, together with restrictions on the uses of the human genome and other regulations on scientific
research. 174
Although all of these U.N. Conventions and Declarations are significant in their effect to structure an international
policy framework for this new age of biotechnology, one central flaw to their permanence and their effectiveness exists:
the fact that principles, covenants, statutes, protocols, declarations, and conventions bind only states which either accede
or ratify them. 175
Another flaw is found within the so-called standards of progressivity that shape any and all political efforts to design
and then enforce a right to health as either a social or a cultural right. 176 This fragile, if not fatally flawed enforcement
mechanism, grants immunity to all states from human rights violations so long as they present evidence of their *435
progressive (or at least measurable) actions toward the realization of human rights. 177
Economic self-interest and political survival determine, in the final analysis, the level of the recognition, the enforcement
of health-care protections, and the extent to which they are accepted or rejected as an integral part of social, cultural,
political, or human rights. A strong civil society, operating freely, is essential in order to secure sustainable human rights
nationally. 178
CONCLUSION
As a concept, principle, normative standard, or value, human dignity may be viewed correctly as predating human rights
because human rights are, in contemporary society, seen as “judicial concretization” of but a generalized notion of human
dignity. 179 Owing to the capacious nature of human rights, clarity of application for human dignity as a normative
standard is understandably elusive. Indeed, attempting to define limits to dignity is especially perplexing since respecting
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dignity not only implies respect for individual autonomy but “the right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being”
or be degraded and humiliated. 180
Standing alone, the virtue of dignity should not be acknowledged as single and distinct as, for example, courage. Rather,
dignity should be understood as “a collection of loosely related traits like self-respect, self- *436 control, and selfdiscipline.” 181 The very taxonomy of human dignity is set within a “context of respect for persons and the value of
autonomy.” 182
All of the international instruments on human rights, at one level or other, have human dignity as their raison d'etre and
end goal. 183 Consequently, the optimum value of maximizing human dignity is codified when laws and policies, which
administer justice, are guided by the central, modern virtue of human dignity. 184 If human dignity is acknowledged as
the ultimate value, or even as a foundational value, it assumes the function of a social ideal rather than that of a value
having any directive utility. 185
It is important to remember that the very ends of medicine are devoted to preserving human dignity and preventing
indignity. 186 It remains for the physician to recognize a duty of beneficence to safeguard the patient from losing dignity
and thereby despairing 187 and be ever mindful that-- independent of bodily pain--extreme abasement and humiliation,
as well as loss of hope and demoralization, may result in acute emotional pain and that this must be dealt with in an
appropriate manner. 188
John Keats, in his 1819 poem, “Ode to a Nightingale” contemplated an “easeful death.” 189 Sylvia Plath, in her 1962
poem, “Lady Lazarus” declared that “[d]ying is an Art.” 190 Today, most individuals, at one time or other, find
themselves pondering whether they will achieve the Keatsian goal or acquire the artistic ability to ensure an artful death
for themselves. To be allowed to die with dignity and free of pain or, *437 alternatively, be forced to accept the “least
worst death” 191 or even a “bad death” 192 is the modern day dilemma. Indeed, refractory physical pain and existential
suffering are all too often an integral part of a prolonged process of dying; all of which led to Henry Fielding's observation
that it is not Death, itself, which is “terrible,” but rather, “[d]ying.” 193
At the end-stage of life, health care management decision-making should be guided by a situation ethic, which is shaped
by common sense, beneficence, compassion, and love 194 and seeks to assure dignity in dying. Consistent with the
principle of medical futility, physicians should be emboldened to take reasonable and sound professional measures
to alleviate pain and existential suffering. 195 When deemed appropriate to a particular case--and consistent with
patient values and life experiences--deep or palliative sedation should, for example, be seen as not only efficacious but
compassionate care that preserves human dignity. 196
The importance of preserving human dignity at the end-of-life should be recognized as a human right. 197 Imprecise
as the term is and conditioned, as such, by economic, cultural, social, and political forces with each member state of
the United Nations, 198 having human dignity nonetheless codified in international policy documents is significant. 199
Although admittedly symbolic, the importance of human dignity, alternatively, as a normative catalyst for on-going
dialogue and for *438 implementation in action programs for the attainment and safeguarding of human rights by
the United Nations ECOSOC and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights cannot be overstated. The
eloquent words in the Preamble to the U.N. Charter which came into force in 1945 remain a clarion call to establish and
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secure “the dignity and the worth of the human person” 200 by recognizing the right to die with dignity as an inviolable
human right. The right to dignity reflects, most appropriately, more than any other right can or does, the very essence
of what being a human being means. 201 Dignity should be viewed rightly as nothing less than “an expression of the
unity of mankind.” 202
Planning end-of-life management decisions or death induction plans, within the framework of human rights protections,
is as important for individuals as it is for the democratic society in which they live. The reason for this linkage is that
these decisions are seen simply as “important in lives.” 203 Even though no right to die is recognized domestically and
internationally, the very right to self-determination, to dignity, and to life--itself--should be acknowledged and respected
especially at the end-stage of life. In the final analysis, “the fundamental questions in law and ethics will be shaped by
what we think it means to be human and what we understand to be ethical obligations owed to the human person,” 204
as well as whether human dignity can be realized as the fundamental vector of force in shaping standards of equality
and social justice. 205
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